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THE INEFFICIENT STATUTE.
In discussing inefficient statutes, it is but fair to say that a
statute may be excellent in its intent, and may be the expression of
a great moral principle of the community, without being enforced,
and that another statute which bears all the earmarks of enforci-
bility, may yet fail of enforcement in fact. An example of the
latter class has so recently been published to the world, that no
news-reading community has failed to observe it with wonder.
In investigating the Iroquois Theatre fire in Chicago, the coroner's
jury finds adequate statutory provisions for the builders' work being
thorough and safe, for ample exits, for fireproof curtain and scenery,
for the separation of stage and auditorium by fireproof devices,
for a supply of fire extinguishing apparatus, and even for the drilling
of employees, and not least in the statutory provisions are require-
ments of periodical, thorough inspection, with authority in the
executive to close the house if it fails to comply with these require-
ments. Yet with every statutory provision ample for enforcing
the law, we find non-enforcement of the most glaring type. Grant-
ing, therefore, that statutes are perfect, we find instances where
they are not enforced owing to official neglect or stupidity, but such
instances are local, sporadic and incidental, not constant, nor inherent
in the nature of statutory law. There are, however, certain classes
of statutes which are not enforced because of inherent defects.
These may be classed broadly as: First, those where the legis-
lature has expressed the sentiment of a portion of the community,
and this sentimet is not accepted by the balance, while the portion
favoring the act is not strong enough to force the dissenters to
yield; second, where public sentiment is so against the act of the
legislative body that local, or general nullification follows; third,
where infringement is so universal that the act is merely the
expression of a sentiment as to what ought to be; fourth, where
the infringement is so difficult of discovery that no one can know
of it, or of the person who has done it, save in exceptional circum-
stances; fifth, where the machinery of enforcement is weak, a com-
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mon development of the first two classes; sixth, where there are
loopholes or "barn doors" in its phraseology and the act is by its
own terms unenforceable; and lastly, when enforcement is left
entirely to the individual harmed by the violation of the law.
As a matter of course, all comment must be illustrated chiefly
from the statutes with which the commentator is most familiar, in
this case those of Connecticut, and doubtless any person familiar
with the statutes of other States would find there, some identical,
and many different acts in illustration of the several principles.
Living in a glass house, we yet dare throw a few stones in a gingerly
way, but beg that no one may consider his own house stone proof
because our stones do not fall without our own walls.
The first class, that where the legislature has expressed the
sentiment of a non-masterful portion of the community, is really
very sweeping, and embraces every statute which is complete in
form and yet not in fact absolutely enforced, varying only in degree
from those acts forbidding robbery and theft (which are, on the
whole, enforced) to- our act forbidding any person to injure a
bicycle path in any way. This last act is the more typical of the
class, because it is least complicated with other causes of failure
and at the same time is not often enforced. Of like simplicity is
the act forbidding the throwing of injurious articles on the highway.
Both of these acts were passed when bicycling was at its zenith,
and the wheelmen were powerful enough to obtain legislation
formally protecting their mounts, yet were in a minority of the
population, and have not since been strong enough to compel
obedience to the statute. (For citations and other instances, refer
to note A.)
In the second class, where public sentiment is against the act,
the local or general nullification which follows, is far more difficult
for the minority which initiated or urged the act to control, than
any other form of opposition. Though the variance may lie between
different classes in the same community, the greater portion of this
nullification is by localities, induced by local prejudices, usually
under the belief that the act was passed by other local influences
which are not worthy of respect outside their own borders. An
instance of this is the failure, in most of our cities, to collect the
tax in commutation of military service. Our acts provide for the
enrollment of all male citizens in the State between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five years, with annotations upon the face of the
rolls to show who are exempt from military service by reason of
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disability, or who, are in some of the classes which are honorably
exempt from militia duty. Upon this roll the towns and cities are
required to collect two dollars from each individual who is not in
an exempt class, and to pay the amount presumably collected
(whether collected in fact or not) to the State, so that where the
tax is not collected from the individuals the moneys paid to the
State must be taken from the proceeds of other forms of taxation.
As a matter of fact, the law if enforced would reach so many voters
who are not otherwise held to any taxable liability, that the political
rulers in many of our local governments are afraid to enforce it
(although it would appear on the face of the statutes that the section
providing imprisonment for failure to pay would be amply severe
to establish success if attempt were made), in the belief that public
sentiment among the irresponsible voters is against such enforce-
ment, and in abject terror lest they make enemies and thereby lose
their political power. The inevitable result of this is contempt of
law among these voters, and an illegal burden upon the shoulders
of those who have other forms of taxes to pay. Unfortunately the
cost of legal proceedings to force these faithless officials to do their
duty is more than the cost of submitting in silence to the wrong.
Here then is a case where an unestablished expectation that public
sentiment may possibly be against a law, nullifies it, as South
Carolina in 1832 attempted to nullify a federal tariff act which
really had public sentiment in that locality established against it.
Had South Carolina found similar political weakness in the Federal
Government at that time, there would have been disunion, and the
wreck of our nation. In Connecticut the wide tire law is a remark-
able instance of general nullification. Passed in J895, it provided
that on and after the first day of July, 1896, all vehicles except
those already in use, used on the highways of this State in the
transportation of merchandise, should have tires of specified widths,
according to the burden that the axles in these vehicles, of specified
sizes, were presumably capable of carrying. In- i899 this was re-
enacted and the exception omitted, so that old vehicles would require
re-tiring, and time was given till July, 1go9, for this. In
x9oi the law was re-enacted, but granting an additional year for
re-tiring. In i9o3 it was modified, practically granting a few more
months leeway, and exempting vehicles in use before July, 1896, on
certain terms. The time for taking advantage of this has passed,
and yet we have not heard of anyone obeying the law, certainly so
far as old vehicles are concerned. Game laws in every State suffer
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local nullification, usually at the hands of the rural population, who
condemn them as "city made" and unworthy of obedience, while city
and country unite in nullifying the trespass laws, which may be
considered country made. These, however, are better described
under the next class. (For citations and other instances of nulli-
fication refer to note B.)
The third class, where infringement is so universal that the act
is no more than the expression of a sentiment as to what ought
to be, is well illustrated by the act which declares that "Every
person who shall use any profane oath, or shall wickedly curse
another, shall be fined one dollar." If this act was strictly enforced
for a single day, and each oath was prosecuted as a separate offense,
what a rolling of dollars there would be. The act undoubtedly has
the moral consent of the major part of the community, and yet
the instances of its enforcement are practically unheard of.
The trespass law lies about equally in this and in the previous
class. Its infringement is universal, with yet a sentiment in its
favor, widely diffused, but with a mental qualification in the mind of
each individual as to just where the law applies to him, which
results as a whole in disregard of the law except where the owner of
the land has indicated that he will enforce it, either by building a high
fence, or by posting signs. The act (although there are two or more,
we need consider but the most recent and complete) has strong
machinery, apparently liberally ample for its enforcement, and yet
how many of the citizens of this State who ever leave the limits
of the cities, have not, within the last twelve months "entered upon
the land of another without the permission. of the owner, occupant,
or person in charge thereof for the purpose of hunting, trapping,
fishing . . . or gathering nuts, fruits or berries," for which
trespass the act in no uncertain terms declares that the trespasser
"shall be fined not more than fifty dollars, or imprisoned not more
than thirty days, or both"? Who has ever heard of an arrest and
conviction under this act? It fails, because immemorial custom
and public sentiment are against it, except where the privilege we
have always enjoyed is wantonly abused, or the owner of the land
has publicly expressed his wish to reserve it for some special pur-
pose. There will also be occasion to refer to this act in the last
class, as one which is left to individuals to enforce. In the present
class, two other acts are especially worthy of comment as conspicuous
examples of universal infringement, the act which reads, "Every
person who affixes to a tree in a public way or place, a playbill,
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picture, notice, advertisement or other thing . . . except for
the purpose of protecting" the tree "and under a written permit
from a tree warden (an officer who is not in existence in most
towns) shall be fined not more than fifty dollars"; and the one
which reads, "No person shall kindle a fire upon the land of another
without permission of the owner or his agent," another fifty dollar
offense. There are innumerable like statutes, less glaringly in-
efficient, but of no more real worth as judged by results. (Refer
to note C.)
The fourth class of acts, whose infringement may not be dis-
covered save under exceptional circumstances, is well illustrated by
our statutes forbidding rooting up, or injuring creeping fern and
arbutus. It is well nigh impossible to pick arbutus flowers without
occasionally pulling up a rootlet, and the infringement is usually
accidental, but the weakest point of all is the fact that no one
except the person doing the act need know that it has been done.
This particular pair of statutes will be spoken of later, as illustrations
of other classes as well, for they are typical failures in several ways.
Another instance of this same class is the act forbidding anyone save
the person to be naturalized, paying for naturalization papers. Only
the two involved can have any knowledge of the transaction, if there
is any desire to conceal it, and one is subject to the penalty, while
the other gains by the violation, and as a rule is too ignorant to
have any idea that it is a criminal offense. It is quite possible that
machinery can be devised to effect the desired end, but as the act
now stands it is dead wood. Some two dozen acts are cited as
falling within this class, a difficult one to remedy (refer to note D),
and it is quite possible that most of these acts are affected by weak
machinery, but by no means fail fundamentally from that cause.
Acts with weak machinery as the cause of their failure, coming
under our fifth class are usually complicated with other causes of
failure. They are so frequently left with weak machinery because
of those other causes (such as the first three already considered)
that an unmixed instance is rare. Perhaps the act which requires
a session of the legislature to remove a sheriff who has abused his
office, is as good an example as any. Another series of weak-kneed
acts are those concerning escheats to the State of the proceeds from
the sale of property left with hotel keepers, common carriers and
administrators of estates of deceased persons. One of these acts
is not even indexed in the statute book, and none of them are fol-
lowed up by any efficient means.
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Since the punishment which may be inflicted on the wrongdoer
is a portion of the routine which is established to deter those who
might otherwise violate the law, it is properly considered part of
the machinery of enforcement. Therefore, among the acts in this
class are several where the legislature has not seriously considered
what form of penalty is most disagreeable to the criminal, but has
lazily applied the commonplace and ineffective forms. These are
considered more in detail on a later page. Another type of weak
machinery is exemplified in our game laws, where in order to
apprehend violators the officerm must cover a wide and indefinite
ground, and the body of officers on whom this task is laid are de-
pendent solely on uncertain and occasional fees for their reward.
Moreover they must ordinarily act on their own initiative, and they
therefore fall under the constant stigma of being interested only
in obtaining their fees, and having no real interest in doing their
duty. That there are any efficient officers under such a system is a
wonder, yet we have a very few. In this State, and probably in every
others, there is a large number of acts which fail largely because
of weak machinery. (Refer to note E.)
The sixth class is composed of acts so carelessly drawn or
expressed that their presumable intent cannot be enforced under
their terms, or acts where the legislature has deliberately provided
an exception to the penalty which is so wide, that anyone who wishes
to get within the exception may readily do so, either in fact, or in
a form to defy detection. An exception may be granted to a narrow
and easily determined class, such as to blind persons or children
under a certain age, and be justifiable from the moral side in cases
where the individual must personally appear in order to claim the
benefit, on the ground that an impostor is readily detected and
punished. There is, however, a large group of exceptions granted
to such wide classes of individuals that anyone may be readily
shielded under the exceptions. An interesting instance of this is
the act passed by the last session of our legislature, granting to all
the residents of one town an exception, over a large area of land
and shore line, to the act forbidding the killing of certain water
birds at night. What officer, hearing a gun fired at night within
that area, would go one step out of his way to determine the resi-
dence of the hunter? A like series of exceptions has been granted
on one's own land, to acts forbidding certain deeds, such as rooting
up arbutus and creeoing fern, spoken of above. So long as the
object of the prohibitive act is to protect something not an article
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of commerce in any form, this provision may possibly be wise,
though a better form is prohibition on the land of another, with
liability in a civil action for the injury. When the protected article
becomes an article of commerce and is removed from the vicinity
where the exception is granted, as are arbutus flowers, fish, game
(not by statute removed from the range of commerce), and like mat-
ters, the permission of the prohibited deed on one's own land makes
prosecution practically impossible and opens a wide door for every-
one to slip into the excepted class, and by a lie which cannot be
proven, avoid the consequences of a wanton and direct violation of
law. If it be granted that there are individuals who will deliberately
violate the law, the legislature in planning for its enforcement must
also grant that the word of such individuals when apprehended
will be absolutely worthless. Before a court every man is presumed
innocent and his word good until the contrary is proven, but the
legislature must consider in passing every act that all men are
potential criminals, and just so soon as they become actual criminals
will they throw dust in the eyes of the judge and jury, if appre-
hended, regardless of morals.
So far as statutes indefinite in terms, or readily avoidable by
their own terms, are concerned, comment is unnecessary, but several
are cited below, and shrewd criminals have undoubtedly discovered
many other statutes with loopholes, not so obvious, but none the
less available from the criminal's standpoint. (Refer to note F.)
Our last class, that of criminal acts whose enforcement is left
solely to the individual harmed, is in this State a very large one.
It is but necessary to point out that a wandering hen may make her
owner a criminal, and that placing barbed wire on a divisional fence
within twenty-five rods of another's house, or fishing in Farm River
-a trout stream leased from adjoining owners by private parties-
may make other criminals, to show the initial error of such acts.
Where the occasional individual is left to enforce a criminal law, it
is not necessary to discuss whether the purpose of the act is wise or
unwise, the error lies in its -haphazard nature. A criminal law
should be strictly enforced, or it should be repealed. Is it
not an error of policy at the least, if not a positive wrong to the
community, to make a deed which harms the individual only, and
has theretofore established only liability in a civil action, a criminal
offense, and then leave it in the hands of an occasional individual
to enforce both his civil and the criminal liability on an unsuspecting,
and ordinarily innocent-minded person? As showing what false
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ideas of the State's function of protection this leads to, we now have
a statute providing for the regular expenditure of State moneys for
employing oyster police, who are confined to patrolling private
oyster beds and nothing else, and for the hire of boats for the use
of these police. It is a scarcely appreciable step from this to State
employment of private watchmen for manufacturing houses.
An exceedingly interesting development in the wrong way may
be traced in one portion of our trespass law, which our last legis-
lature made into a penal act simply, with elaborate machinery for
enforcement. In 1726 it was provided that the person or persons
throwing down or leaving open, bars, fences or gates, should pay
to the party injured double damage and five dollars, "and forasmuch
as it is at some times very difficult to detect or convict any trespassers
against this act in the ordinary method or course of the law, by
reason the trespasses are generally committed where full evidence
can scarcely be had, Be it therefore enacted" that if there were
"any dispute" the plaintiff had but to show probable cause, and
there was a real burden of proof (as the community at that time
considered a burden of proof) then laid upon the defendant to
prove his defence; and providing further a flogging for persons
who disguised themselves and then committed the trespass, this
being properly considered evidence of criminal intent and malice.
In the revision of i9O2 the same misdeeds were united with other
offenses in a single paragraph, and the breach was made for the first
time purely criminal, apparently relieving the trespasser from any
civil liability whatsoever. In the Acts of 1903 this was repeated
and machinery was provided which "looks well," but is as a matter
of fact, no more efficient than that of the Act of 1726. Inasmuch
as the point of a trespass law lies in the detection of the offender,
is it not at least an open question whether the civil action under the
Act of 1726 was not as effective as is the criminal action under the
present act, and whether the owner of the land was not really in a
better position, first by reason of the necessity of far less strict and
formal proof in a civil, than in a criminal action, and second,
by obtaining direct recompense for his loss or damage, with an
additional "bonus" to make good other losses occasioned by un-
discovered trespassers. So far as other provisions of our tres-
pass act are concerned, forbidding mere entry on the land of another
(as referred to in the earlier part of this article), which are the
deadest of dead letters, they should be either strictly enforced and
our lands at once take on the exclusive ownership rights of Eng-
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land's, barring all but the owner and his personal friends from the
enjoyment of woods and fields, or else the act should suffer the fate
that all haphazard laws deserve. In its present condition it is a
continual menace to respectful treatment of all our laws. While
it is only proper that, following injuries which are subject to redress
by civil action, the initiative in such action should rest in the in-
dividual, it scarcely conduces to the dignity of the State to make a
deed an offence against its sovereignty, and then provide no State
machinery to detect the offense until some individual is so harmed
that he is driven to action. If the deed is an injury to the whole
community it is not right to trust the interests of the whole com-
munity to indifferent, occasional and unskillful hands. If the
injury is to one or two individuals within the community who can
obtain redress by a civil action, it is "using a cannon to kill a chipping
bird" to make the injury to an insignificant portion of the community
a crime. In this State it is a crime to pull up arbutus roots, to
destroy walking fern, to permit fowls (after notice) to trespass on
a neighbor's land, to pick a huckleberry or a cranberry on another's
waste land, to walk in another's orchard in the dead of winter, or
to fish in Farm River, which is leased from the owners of the land
by a private fishing club, and there are many other crimes of like
insignificance. Lest anyone shall take exception to the name "crime"
for these minor statutory offenses, it may be well to cite the defini-
tion of the word as given by our Supreme Court: "A crime is an
act committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or com-
manding it." We have invented many such crimes; in fact, we
have one whole chapter in our statute book chiefly given up to them,
and they are sprinkled elsewhere throughout the book. Some of
them are cited below. (Refer to note G.)
Perhaps it is as well at this point to give some attention to the
principles which govern the successful enforcement of law. Of
course the great guarantee of strict enforcement is that universal
sentiment which instantly condemns the offender upon the com-
mission of the deed, and which freely insures such assistance to the
officers and courts as every citizen is able to give. Murder, robbery,
rape and arson are such crimes, and the criminal finds friends only
among like criminals or his own immediate family, while they, too,
very often join the community in its wrath. Closely following are
such acts as are generally obeyed in form at least, if not in spirit, by
the individual, and enforced by public opinion because it is recog-
nized that they are necessary for the life or commercial ease of the
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community, such as tax laws in general and the rules of the road.
The next principle of enforcement lies in the power of the
majority to establish machinery by which the minority may be
forced to accept its rulings. A portion of this machinery may be
self acting, and other portions may have only capacity for motion
which must be started and maintained by outside effort. The ef-
fectiveness of all statutes must depend upon this machinery, from
those providing for the exercise of the right of eminent domain to
those requiring the registry of dogs (and including even the effec-
tiveness of the statutes by which the law-abiding majority attempts
to coerce the minority of criminals who are hostile to all law because
it is law), and statutes are only effective so far as the machinery is
really self-acting, or the sentiment of the majority insures prosecu-
tion by individuals of every known infringement. Where the act
defining the law permits the individual to represent the majority
in a trivial matter when he sees fit, and to prosecute or not, at will,
for a violation which his neighbor considers unworthy of notice,
the provisions can hardly be called effective. The trespass acts,
spoken of above, and those considered in the last class under the
general classification of unenforceable laws, come under this head,
and are so completely subject to individual and local option that in
a distance of a few miles they may vary from live issues to dead
wood, and in many cases but a single individual in a community
will enforce some provision of these laws, while all his neighbors
take no interest, and may even jeer at him for his position.
Permissive acts, or acts such as those providing for registry of
deeds, etc., where the benefits outweigh the cost, are, of course, self
enforced. There are a series of acts, however, which are futile
attempts to enforce the will of a body or a majority, which are well
worth attention, These acts depend for their enforcement upon
nominally self-acting machinery, but are either drafted with loop-
holes which permit evasion, or have a divided sentiment of the
community behind them, so that evasions are ordinarily overlooked
(as is the case with the liquor laws in some communities), or with
an inadequate official system, so that nobody is responsible, or can
be held to his responsibility, for their enforcement. Such laws
may "look well" on the statute book as indicating that we have good
intentions, but it is said that "the road to hell is paved with good
intentions," and when that which should be used as a barricade is
converted into stepping stones along that way, it is a disgrace to the
community which permits it. The moral effect of unenforced stat-
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utes on the weak and easily tempted, and on that portion of the
community which only obeys any law because of fear of physical
force, is subtle and disastrous. Every time such an individual says,
"Oh, yes, it is against the law, but the law isn't enforced," his phrase,
and usually his whole mental attitude, includes all law, and his
respect for law as a whole is weakened. In his mind obedience of
law gradually becomes a question merely of investigating the chances
of being hit, and of determining how hard the blow will be if he
is not successful in avoiding it. The fact that because it is law it
should be obeyed becomes nothing. Soon only the grasp of an
officer's hand on his shoulder means "law" to him, and to the
criminal in that condition all the rest is a game of chance and a
g-amble against more or less carefully calculated odds when he
disobeys. If he loses, it is all part of the game, and merely indicates
that he was not quite careful enough of his odds. So we build
criminals and encourage their development in accordance with a
law higher than any legislative act, the law that the individual always
acts for his own ultimate gain. Some of us may be able to see tfhis
gain in the advancement of the community at our own personal
temporary loss, sometimes we are ready to postpone our gain and
leave it to our descendants, but the reason is fundamentally the
same, that we find satisfaction in one form or another as the reward
of our forbearance. How far the individual yields to the community
or to posterity depends on how keen an imagination he has, and
how keenly he sees the result of his forbearance, consequently the
temptation to violate unenforced laws is in direct proportion to
the real intelligence and training of the individual, and the under-
mining influences of such laws are greatest where respect for law
is most necessary to the community.
In order to have any statute enforced we must have machinery,
courts to determine whether or not there has been an invasion of
the prohibited ground, officers to apprehend invaders, either of their
own motion or on complaint, and to execute the penalty after judg-
ment, and we are also accustomed to a pardoning power which may be
used in case of error, or where leniency may well be of benefit to
the community. In order that the statutes and laws may be re-
spected the courts must be impartial, but it is no less necessary if we
would maintain this respect for law, that the officers be efficient and
that apprehension be almost as certain as the commission of the
offense, and conviction almost as certain as apprehension. There
has grown up in our criminal courts a system of excluding every
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possible error, which is so perfect that a false conviction is practically
an impossibility, but it has also made the ratio of escape for criminals
so great that it is growing to be a serious question whether we have
not drawn the lines too closely, and in protecting the liberties of
the innocent man at the hands of the law, laid him open to
unlimited encroachments on his liberty at the hands of the lawless.
There is no pardoning power to remedy this latter error, as there
is for an error of law or court. Exact statistics of crime are not
to be had, but let us consider that there have been in one year in
the United States, some 7oo cases of murder, in only 6oo of which
were there any arrests, and in only 200 have the murderers been
punished. This is our most universally detested crime, yet he who
would commit deliberate murder can count on his chances of punish-
ment being less than one in three, if such be the true proportion, and
can readily determine whether his gain is worth the chance. If
statistics of the violation of our statutory crimes were possible, how
minute would be the proportion of arrests, and how infinitesimal
the proportion of convictions! That some percentage must go
unpunished is inevitable under any system of law which protects the
innocent from suffering unmerited and unjust penalties, but the
point to consider is, that the irresponsible and vicious elements in
the community figure on their chances of punishment for every
violation of every law which they know is in existence, and their
contempt of all law, and their encroachment upon the law-abiding
portion of the community, is in direct proportion to the number of
statutes which within their knowledge are not enforced, or are but
negligently enforced.
The machinery is, therefore, aside from that weight of public
opinion which is irresistible, the most potent instrument of enforce-
ment and the one which is most susceptible of development by well
considered legislation.
The reader may ask what is to be done about these inefficient
acts. It is easy to destroy, but nothing is so unjustifiable as mere
destructive criticism of matter which has any foundation whatsoever
in right or policy. One session of our legislature might well do
nothing but repeal or amend all the acts which are not capable of en-
forcement, cutting out and correcting also all of the penal acts where
the injury is rather to the individual than to the State, and where ade-
quate redress may be had if the offender is discoverable, by a civil
action. (If the offender may not be discovered, one type of action
is as futile as another.) In some cases the recoverable damages
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may be made penal, though the action is civil, as our fathers and
forefathers made them for one hundred and seventy-five years under
part of the trespass act. and as we still do in civil actions for bringing
false suit and for forgery, where they are doubled, and for willful re-
moval of a bridge, taking unlawful interest, and injury to guide
posts, where they are trebled. The ruling in the case of Osborne v.
Warren in 1877 makes of this type of redress an exceedingly efficient
weapon in the hands of the injured party, holding that the party
needs but to prove the injury, unless the statute requires proof also
of malice. Would it not be all sufficient if to these civil rights be
added the provision that irresponsible parties shall suffer imprison-
ment until these penal damages be paid or worked off? This may
be done in an action under one statute (Sec. io98), which provides
"when any person shall wilfully and without color of right, commit
trespass on the lands of another by cutting or destroying any trees,
carrying away any wood or rails" . . . and the judgment
against him remains unpaid thirty days, "he shall be committed to
the county jail or workhouse, there to be kept at hard labor not
exceeding sixty days" under certain qualifications which do not
change the spirit of the act, though limiting its effectiveness by
making the injured party, in some cases, pay the offender's board
in jail. If the action were criminal, these qualifications would not
exist, it is true, but they are by no means a fundamental part of the
civil action, and are, in fact, a detriment to it, since the court, in
determining the original judgment, will always consider the ability
of the defendant to save himself from prison if he is poor and not
vicious.
If our legislature after removing from the statutory list of
crimes all injuries which are solely to the individual, should then
provide adequate machinery for the apprehension of all whose mis-
deeds are a harm to the community as a whole, its session would
perform a labor whose consummation would add more dignity to
this State in the eyes of all the rest of the States of the Union,
and represent a more notable achievement in genuine advancement of
respect for law and order than has ever been accomplished since
Magna Charta.
In our great republic, with a population of the best and the
worst elements from every race, our only hope for permanent insti-
tutions is that fundamental respect for law, because it is law, which
is native and inborn in the Anglo-Saxon, and which the children
of our citizens from other lands learn, without realizing it, in a
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generation or two, if they come into contact with it in its best form.
Every time a law is consciously violated because it is not enforced,
a blow is struck which tells most severely on our foreign-born
citizens, but nevertheless undermines and weakens the best and
most patriotic among us in direct proportion to our realization of
what we are doing. Charles G. Morris.




ACT, THE EXPRESSION OF SENTIMENT OF A PORTION OF COMMUNITY, WHICH
CANNOT BE ENFORCED STRICTLY.
1176. Injury to bicycle paths (cited in D).
1177. Throwing injurious articles on highway.
43. Illegal practices to obtain election.
1404. Prize packages.
Many other instances, standing more specially under other classes, and
there noted, such as wide tire law (B), betting laws (C), limit on fish or
game (D), gaming (E), repair to highway (F), and entering orchard (G).
B.
(Second Class.)
PUBLIC SENTIMENT AGAINST THE ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE, CAUSING GENERAL
NULLIFICATION.
1895 (Chap. 30). Wide tire law.
i9OI (Chap. 34). Wide tire law.
i9o3 (Chap. 138). Wide tire law.
14o5. Unauthorized credit to minor student.
1370. Sunday concerts.
1177. Throwing injurious articles on highway (cited in A).
LOCAL NULLIFICATION.
2693 and 2694. Furnishing liquors to person receiving town aid.
2696. Furnishing liquors to an intoxicated person.
4472. Search for unregistered dogs.
2995, 2998 and 2395. Military commutation tax.
2313. Poll taxes on individuals not otherwise taxed.
2o45. Guide posts.
3132. Sunday shooting (cited under E).
3130. Snaring and trapping game.
1296. Boycotting and intimidation.
1173. Destruction of posters and notices (cited in D).
n179. Vehicle with chained wheel.
ii8o. Repairs after injury to highway (cited in E).
I21j. Trespass acts (cited in C).
i2I. Kindling fire not properly protected (cited in C).




UNIVERSAL INFRINGEMENT, ACT MERELY EXPRESSING A SENTIMENT AS TO WHAT
OUGHT TO BE.
I9O3 (Chap. i99). Trespass act (often cited).
1323-1324. Profanity or cursing.
1374. Wild carrots and thistles.
4447. Posters on trees.
i22o. Kindling fires on another's land.
I22. Kindling fires on own land.
3X63. Fishing in water supplies.
1387. Betting on horse racing (cited under D).
2296-2297. Feeble attempt to get list of personal property (cited in E).
1213. Trespass act.
1701. Betting on election (cited in D).
1711. Covering "pairing" at election.
2o29. Cutting brush along highway.
D.
(Fourth Class.)
INFRINGEMENT MAY NOT BE DISCOVERED SAVE UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUM-
STANCES.
1223 and 1224. Arbutus and creeping fern (cited in F).
4418. Paying for naturalization papers.
1176. Injury to bicycle paths (cited in A).
1222. Fire from cigar, etc.
4674. Riding on bicycle sidepath without license.
4614. False statements by employment agencies.
3249. Taking shellfish at night.
314o. Number of trout limited.
3123-3126. Number of game birds.
3125. Transportation of game.
43. Illegal practices to obtain election (cited in A).
3156. Misrepresenting stream shad come from.
1173. Injury to posters (cited in B).
1174. Injury to library book.
1216. Poisoned food.
1373. Neglect to close bars or gate at railroad crossing.
1387. Betting on horse racing (cited in C).
1701. Betting on election (cited in C).
25 5. Intentionally injuring drinking water.
2622-2623. Explosive compounds, making and marking.
1218-1223. Injury to property of another (cited in G).
1233. Releasing animals with intent to impound.
These are almost all affected by, but do not necessarily
weak machinery, and might often be classed under E.
fail because of
446 YALE LAW J0URNAL.
E.
(Fifth Class.)
WEAK MACHINERY OF ENFORCEMENT, OR NO MACHINERY AT ALL.
1762. Requires a session of the General Assembly to remove a faithless
sheriff from office.
4166. Escheats, not even indexed, from hotels.
4676 and 4679. Escheats from carriers.
413 and 414. Escheats from estates.
4447. Posters on trees (cited in C).
4068. Barbed wire along highways.
3139, 3145, 3146, 3151, 3152. Small fish.
3132. Sunday shooting (cited in B).




2693, 2694 and 2696. Furnishing liquor to person receiving town aid, or
already intoxicated.
316, 1319, 1320. Keeping house of ill fame (fines no deterrent, imprison-
Inent only real penalty for keeper).
1336. Tramps (imprisonment during winter no deterrent).
F.
(Sixth Class.)
'LOOPHOLES, DARN DOORS AND OTHER FAILINGS WHICH MAKE EVASION EASY.
INDEFINITE IN TERMS.
4368. Requiring officer to make "annual visits to different sections of
the State" to investigate, etc.
3248. Taking oysters from unmarked grounds. Meaning owner, or
thief? Worthless by own terms.
4374 and 4375. Together release a horse with an infectious disease,
from quararqtine after 3o days.
3299. Words "from said water" refer to nothing, yet limit the effect
of the statute to an undiscoverable body of water.
DODGEABLE BY OWN TERMS.
3252. Intent to speculate in oyster beds.
32o6. "Presumptive evidence" readily rebutted under Sec. 3205.
118o. Repair after injury to highway (cited in B).
3856. Written permit.
PERMISSION TO AN INDEFINITE CLASS IS PERMISSION TO THE WORLD.
1223 and 1224. Creeping fern and arbutus "on land of another."
19o3 (Chap. 8). Exemption to all residents of one town, night shooting.
3142. Sale of hatchery trout for eating.
19o3 (Chap. 95). Exemption from attachment.





INJURY TO INDIVIDUAL RATHER THAN TO STATE, ACTION LEFT IN HIS HANDS.
I903 (Chaps. 41 and i99). Trespass acts which developed the wrong way.
I225. Trespass by chickens.
1218, 1223, I23O and 1234. Injury to property of another.
3253. Towing dredge on private oyster bed. Either theft and amply
covered by 3246 or else merely ground of civil action.
I9o3 (Chap. 21). Tampering with gas pipes and meter. Like preceding.
4o69. Barbed wire on division fence.
3308. Injury to dams or gate of oyster bed.
3305. Injury to private oyster grounds.
3168. Fishing Farm River.
1296. Intimidation (cited in B).
1229. Enticing bees.
i228. Entering orchard.
And a large number of the 72 acts under Chap. 84 of the General Statutes
(Secs. 1182 to 1233 inclusive).
AS SHOWING WHAT THIS LEADS TO:
324o. State money used for private purposes, oyster police are to patrol
private beds only.
io7I. Special reward for capture of chicken and horse thieves only.
